This week, our special series turns to Asia. We begin with Russia, Türkiye and Central Asia: three settings that neither constitute a single region nor share one culture, and should not be read as variations on some imagined Oriental despotism. We bring them together for another reason. Over the past two years, several of these states have made family and birth rates explicit government priorities, complete with names and timetables. Russia declared 2024 the Year of the Family; Türkiye followed its 2025 Year of the Family with a Decade of the Family and Population running until 2035; and the Central Asian republics have each, in their own way, reformed laws on marriage and violence in the home. We do not know whether these policies were copied from one another, and we will not claim that they were. Our interest is in a more specific question, one that feminists across the region have been asking for years. What options does a woman have for leaving a violent relationship when the state has decided that it is the family that must be protected? We report what we have been able to check and identify what we cannot. Two gaps should be acknowledged from the outset: we have not found feminist work in Tajik or Turkmen that we can cite with confidence, and almost none of the books mentioned here have been translated into Spanish.
1. The Family as a Matter of State
On 2 May 2026, Türkiye’s Official Gazette published Presidential Circular 2026/4, declaring 2026–2035 the Decade of the Family and Population. The circular begins with falling fertility, described as the lowest in the history of the Republic, and requires every public institution to align its policies with family and population objectives and report annually on its actions. It establishes a National Family Week in the final week of May. One of its provisions envisages a “digital family shield” to identify and prevent media content deemed harmful. Among the tendencies it identifies as dangerous is cinsiyetsizleştirme, which can be translated as “de-gendering” or “erasure of gender”. Critical outlets such as BirGün read the circular as an attempt to confine women within family policy.
Four months later, the circular ceased to be merely a statement of intent. On 12 September, Turkish police launched Operation “Ailem Güvende” (“My Family Is Safe”) against LGBTI+ associations and organisations working on HIV across several provinces. Justice Minister Akın Gürlek said that 162 people, nine associations and 13 premises were under investigation in 15 provinces, and stated that the operations were consistent with the vision of the Decade of the Family and Circular 2026/4. Organisations searched included Kaos GL, SPoD and Lambdaistanbul. Amnesty International described the operation as part of a worsening rights crisis, while more than 450 organisations in 65 countries called for the release of those detained. This matters because governments rarely put the connection between demographic policy and police operations in writing so explicitly.
The legislative route had been different. A draft of the eleventh judicial package, in October 2025, proposed prison terms of one to three years for conduct “contrary to biological sex and public morality” and raised the minimum age for legal gender reassignment to 25. Following protests by women and LGBTI+ people in several cities, those provisions were removed. They were announced again for the twelfth package but did not appear there either. That package was adopted on 16 July 2026 and published on 31 July as Law 7589, without those measures.
Russia has taken a different route towards a similar outcome. Since November 2024, federal law has banned the “promotion” of voluntarily choosing not to have children. In February 2025, a woman in Sevastopol received the first fine, of 50,000 roubles, for posts she had not deleted. Regional laws penalising “inducement to have an abortion” have proliferated: sources counted 24 territories at the start of 2026 and 31 by late May, according to The Moscow Times. In entire regions, private clinics have stopped performing abortions at patients’ request. In Sverdlovsk, all of them did so “on their own initiative”, according to the regional health ministry cited by Mediazona in March 2026.
The Vologda region shows how difficult it is to measure the effects. Its governor, Georgy Filimonov, wrote in June that 309 abortions had been performed in 2025, compared with 1,679 the previous year: a fall of 81.6%. Vedomosti reported a different series from the federal health ministry: 1,653 pregnancy terminations in 2025 against 3,044 in 2024, a decrease of 45.7%. That federal category, however, also includes spontaneous pregnancy losses and is not directly comparable to the number of abortions performed. The regional department itself told Vedomosti that recorded medical abortions numbered 263 in 2025 and 1,538 in 2024, a fall of 82.9%. Meduza has also documented women travelling to neighbouring regions for abortions, meaning that a lower regional figure tells us nothing definitive about how many pregnancies were terminated.
Turkish sociologist Serpil Sancar gave a name to this political division of labour in a 2012 book that remains influential, Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti: Erkekler Devlet, Kadınlar Aile Kurar (“The Gender of Turkish Modernisation: Men Build the State, Women Build the Family”). The Decade of the Family can be read as a new version of that formula.
Sources
Medyascope, llamamiento de más de 450 organizaciones, 21 de septiembre de 2026
Bianet, «Resmi Gazete’de yayımlandı: 12. Yargı Paketi neleri değiştiriyor?», 31 de julio de 2026 · Resmî Gazete, 7589
Novaya Gazeta Europe, primera multa por «propaganda childfree», 1 de febrero de 2025
ABNews, descenso del 81,6 % anunciado en Vólogda, 2 de junio de 2026
Vedomosti, estadísticas federales y aclaración sobre pérdidas gestacionales, 2 de julio de 2026
Meduza, obstáculos para acceder al aborto y desplazamientos entre regiones, 28 de abril de 2025
2. Being Able to Leave
Leaving a violent relationship requires somewhere to sleep, money to live on and an authority that will not send you back home. Several of those forms of support have changed across the region this autumn, and not always in the same direction.
In Türkiye, on 4 June 2026, the Constitutional Court voted by a majority to strike down the words süresiz olarak (“indefinitely”) from Article 175 of the Civil Code, which allowed post-divorce maintenance on grounds of poverty to be awarded without a time limit. The judgment was published in the Official Gazette on 30 September and will take effect on 30 June 2027. It does not abolish maintenance or automatically cancel existing awards, but leaves Parliament to set a limit that has yet to be determined. Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız, a platform that publishes monthly civil-society counts of femicides in Türkiye, devotes part of its October report to criticising this limitation and linking it to unpaid care work and the freedom to divorce.
Kazakhstan is the most ambiguous case. Following the trial for the murder of Saltanat Nukenova by her husband, former minister Kuandyk Bishimbayev, the country increased penalties for domestic violence in 2024. On 16 July 2025, the president signed a law criminalising stalking, punishable by up to 50 days’ detention, and coercion into marriage, punishable by up to ten years in prison in aggravated cases; the latter provision also covers bride kidnapping. In June 2026, Deputy Interior Minister Sanzhar Adilov told Parliament that 83 stalking cases and 12 forced-marriage cases had been sent to trial over five months, and proposed a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment for repeat stalking. At the same time, Human Rights Watch says the country no longer has a specific domestic violence law and that domestic violence remains without a distinct criminal offence. Appearing before the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on 6 October, the government promised a law criminalising it. Anthropologist Cynthia Werner, who studied bride kidnapping in southern Kazakhstan, showed in 2009 how claims of its supposed “resurgence” were framed through local discourses of shame and tradition. Other research disputes whether the practice has increased. Here, “tradition” serves both to justify the practice and to suggest it belongs to the past.
In Uzbekistan, which made domestic violence a criminal offence in April 2023, Human Rights Watch reported in March 2026 that legal reform had moved faster than implementation. It cited a 2024 study by civil-society organisations and the UNDP indicating that more than half of the cases opened since criminalisation had been dismissed, and noted that reconciliation was still used in these proceedings, although the mandatory reconciliation period in divorces involving violence was abolished in February 2025. Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court, meanwhile, reported that more than 10,000 people had been prosecuted for domestic violence during the first ten months of 2025.
In Kyrgyzstan, the number of domestic violence cases is rising, but figures for funding shelters need careful treatment. At the UN Commission on the Status of Women in March 2026, the Supreme Court reported 1,196 cases in 2025, 24% more than in 2024, attributing the rise to better detection. Representatives of crisis centres said in March that funding had dropped from 28 million soms in 2025 to a planned 15 million in 2026. Yet on 5 November, a ministry official said 28.6 million had been earmarked to those centres as part of a wider 115-million-som budget for social projects. Without knowing the actual expenditure and precise scope of these funds, we cannot determine how much support reached shelters. More cases do not necessarily mean more violence. Kyrgyz researcher Syinat Sultanalieva has studied the activists who sustain much of this support network. She proposes the concept of “nomadity of being” to describe a feminism built from local resources rather than imported from outside.
In Tajikistan, domestic violence, marital rape and online violence are not explicitly criminalised, according to the International Commission of Jurists and the Tajik organisation Right and Prosperity. A court can lower the minimum age of marriage to 17. During the Universal Periodic Review in Geneva on 5 November, Belgium, Chile, Iceland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom recommended criminalising gender-based and domestic violence. At the close of this review, we have not been able to verify which of those recommendations the government has accepted.
In Russia’s North Caucasus, the human rights organisation Ad Rem has documented domestic violence cases from 2018 to 2025, mostly in Chechnya, in which police and families have worked together to return women who fled to their homes, and has warned of threats against those helping them. According to Novaya Gazeta Europe’s account, these practices are now spreading to other regions. Ad Rem’s report Persecution Instead of Protection, published before that article, documents the use of public institutions against women trying to escape abuse. We are not naming the people working in these networks.
Sources
Anayasa Mahkemesi, sentencia E. 2025/156, K. 2026/131, de 4 de junio de 2026; Euronews Türkçe, sobre la publicación el 30 de septiembre de 2026
Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu, Ekim 2026 Raporu, 6 de noviembre de 2026
Time.kz, «От настойчивости до преследования», 9 de junio de 2026 · Прокуратура Республики Казахстан
Human Rights Watch, «Kazakhstan Women Need Action on Domestic Violence», 14 de octubre de 2026
Human Rights Watch, «Uzbekistan’s Domestic Violence Reforms Fall Short», 4 de marzo de 2026
Kabar, aumento del 24 % en las causas por violencia familiar en 2025, marzo de 2026; 24.kg / For.kg, denuncia de reducción presupuestaria para centros de crisis, marzo de 2026; Sputnik Кыргызстан, declaración ministerial sobre la financiación, 5 de noviembre de 2026 (en kirguís)
Novaya Gazeta Europe, artículo sobre las prácticas documentadas por Ad Rem, 17 de marzo de 2026
3. Who Counts, and Who Can Dissent
Türkiye does not publish official femicide statistics. Women’s organisations count them, each using its own methodology. Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız recorded 20 women killed by men and 39 suspicious deaths in October 2026. Fifteen of the 20 murders involved firearms, and nine took place in the victim’s home. The Federation of Women’s Associations of Türkiye counted 21 murders and 12 suspicious deaths in the same month. Each organisation uses its own methodology. The platform itself faced a lawsuit seeking its dissolution from April 2022 for activities “contrary to law and morality” and for “undermining the family”; an Istanbul court dismissed the case on 13 September 2023.
In Russia, both counting and dissent have become dangerous. In April 2024, the Prosecutor General’s Office designated Feminist Anti-War Resistance, formed the day after the invasion of Ukraine began, as “undesirable”. The Ministry of Justice added it to the register. Participation in its activities can carry administrative or criminal penalties, depending on the circumstances. It had already designated the network a “foreign agent” in December 2022. On 4 June 2026, the financial monitoring agency Rosfinmonitoring added OVD-Info and 35 other organisations to its “extremist” list as alleged parts of Memorial, which had been declared extremist in April at a hearing without lawyers. OVD-Info and Memorial do not specialise in gender-based violence; they document political repression. Their persecution forms part of a closing civic space in which groups helping women must also work, at increasing risk.
Finnish sociologist Inna Perheentupa followed grassroots feminist collectives in Russia throughout the 2010s and described how they sustained their work with very few resources under mounting pressure. Her ethnography, published in 2022, portrays a world much of which has since been forced into exile.
In Kyrgyzstan, a 2024 law requires NGOs receiving foreign funding and engaging in activities the law deems political to register as “foreign representatives”, in a framework resembling Russia’s 2012 legislation. Comparing the statutes and the way they were enacted could establish how far one was copied from the other. That comparison remains to be done.
Sources
Evrensel, informe de feminicidios de octubre de 2026, 6 de noviembre de 2026
Diken, «KCDP: Geçen ay 20 kadın öldürüldü, 39 kadının ölümü şüpheli», 6 de noviembre de 2026
Federación de Asociaciones de Mujeres de Turquía (TKDF), recuento de octubre de 2026
Bianet, «KCDP kapatma davası reddedildi», 13 de septiembre de 2023
Mediazona, declaración de «organización indeseable» contra la Resistencia Feminista Antiguerra, 27 de abril de 2024 · УК РФ, ст. 284.1
Human Rights Watch, «Russia: Rights Group OVD-Info Designated “Extremist”», 5 de junio de 2026; Meduza, sobre la inclusión en el registro de Rosfinmonitoring, 4 de junio de 2026
4. Panic Buttons, Shields and Aerials
Technology appears in this radar as an infrastructure both of protection and control, and only rarely as artificial intelligence.
KADES, the Turkish Interior Ministry’s emergency app, allows users to summon police help with a button and shares their location. According to ministry figures circulated by Anadolu Ajansı on 27 July 2026, the app had been downloaded 9,859,147 times and had received 239,356 alerts, of which 152,974 were recorded as genuine and 86,382 as unfounded. In June, Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi had given a different number of alerts, 2,117,098, alongside a similar download count. Both figures are attributed to the same ministry, but we have found no explanation that reconciles them: they should not be compared as though they measured exactly the same thing. Neither tells us how many women were protected. An official tally of downloads is not a tally of individual users.
The circular’s “digital family shield” remains, for now, an objective without a known technical specification. What has happened, according to ILGA-Europe, is the blocking of the websites and social-media accounts of several LGBTI+ associations before the September operation. In Russia, the law against “childfree propaganda” is applied mainly to online publications. In 2023, the European Court of Human Rights found against Russia in Glukhin v. Russia for using facial recognition on the Moscow metro to identify and arrest a protester. In Turkmenistan, since mid-April 2026, police have searched rooftops to confiscate Starlink aerials that some residents used to bypass one of the world’s slowest and most heavily censored internet systems, according to RFE/RL and Times of Central Asia.
Sources
Anadolu Ajansı, datos reproducidos por TRT Haber sobre KADES, 27 de julio de 2026
Demirören Haber Ajansı (DHA), declaración del ministro sobre KADES, 9 de junio de 2026
RFE/RL, «Rooftop Raids: Turkmenistan Cracks Down On Starlink Users», 30 de abril de 2026
Times of Central Asia, «Turkmenistan Begins Seizing and Dismantling Starlink Equipment», 2026
Further reading
Deniz Kandiyoti, «Bargaining with Patriarchy», Gender & Society, 2(3), 1988, pp. 274–290. The article that introduced the idea of the “patriarchal bargain”, by a Turkish sociologist, compares women’s strategies in sub-Saharan Africa and what she calls classic patriarchy, including Türkiye and the Middle East.
Madina Tlostanova, What Does It Mean to Be Post-Soviet? Decolonial Art from the Ruins of the Soviet Empire, Duke University Press, 2018. A decolonial reading of the post-Soviet space through contemporary art.
Dilar Dirik, The Kurdish Women’s Movement: History, Theory, Practice, Pluto Press, 2022.