Gender-based violence
Iran's women are not an argument
Reading time: 23 min
Listen
Read aloud with your device's voice.
The street, work, the law and the gallows in Iran in November 2026, between a state that has committed crimes against humanity and a war that bombed a school.

Special series ‘Feminisms, violence and possible futures’
Content note. This article discusses violence against women, executions and the deaths of children in an attack.
On 10 November, Iran’s judiciary announced the arrest of several people on Tehran’s Iranshahr Street for ‘promoting the abandonment of the hijab’. Shops and two bookshops had previously been closed, and a Halloween party broken up. The head of the judiciary called for action against ‘abnormal behaviour’, while an MP denied that the law had been abandoned. Four days later, an AFP report described women walking through the same city with their hair uncovered, enjoying a freedom not seen since 2022.
Both pictures are true at once, and neither is Iran as a whole. Iranshahr is a street of bookshops and cafés in the city centre, frequented by young, middle-class customers. The people arrested have not been identified, and we do not know whether they were women. What we do know is that, this same autumn, a Tehran court has again sentenced a Kurdish activist to death; the state has executed at least 34 people in connection with the January uprising; and, in the south, families in Minab are still waiting for someone to be held accountable for the missiles that struck their children’s school on 28 February.
This article attempts to look at Iranian women in 2026 without reducing them to the veil or turning their lives into anybody’s argument: neither the regime’s, which invokes the war to demand silence about repression, nor that of those who invoke repression to justify the bombings. Our rule is easy to state and difficult to follow: identify each act of violence with its perpetrator, date, source and evidentiary standard, and never use one death toll to offset another.
Freedom that can be punished
November’s tolerance admits several interpretations. On 9 September, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, acknowledged that wartime conditions prevented the authorities from confronting this issue as they otherwise would. A week later, the Associated Press described leaders restraining hardliners for fear of a public backlash during the war. Tolerance may, therefore, be a calculation by those in power. It may also reflect institutional rivalries, the practical inability to enforce the rules, or simply a victory won from below. For four years, many women have gone out uncovered, making the law’s demands increasingly unenforceable. Read as a concession, the state remains the protagonist; read as an achievement, women regain that role. No documents settle the question, and it would be wrong to credit the state apparatus with a strategy nobody has proved.
What is clear is that this freedom can be punished at any moment. The ‘Chastity and Hijab’ law passed in 2024 was suspended that December at the request of the Supreme National Security Council, but Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code, which penalises appearing in public without the required hijab, remains in force. Punishment is selective. In late September, an appeals court in Qom upheld a sentence of 74 lashes against singer Parastoo Ahmadi and the musicians who accompanied her in a recorded, unveiled concert. On 9 November, according to Iran International, Tehran prosecutors summoned and accused of spreading falsehoods a gynaecologist who had spoken publicly about rising single motherhood among young women born in the 2000s, after a channel aligned with the Revolutionary Guards called for action against her. The state polices clothing, but also family life, motherhood and leisure.
Feminist Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, one of the organisers of the 2006 One Million Signatures campaign, published an essay in May 2023 that helps us avoid mistaking Iranshahr for the whole country. She begins in 2017, when Vida Movahedi stood on a utility box on Enghelab Street and raised her headscarf on a stick. At the time, the radical gesture did not bring middle-class daughters with it; five years later, the same gesture became part of an uprising. With appropriate caution, and without claiming to prove her account, Ahmadi Khorasani looks inside families. An intermediate generation of mothers, themselves wounded by compulsory veiling, had learnt slow, low-cost tactics, protecting their daughters in private and semi-public ‘greenhouses’ or through plans to emigrate. The economic collapse of the middle class, sanctions and the 2021 elections shattered those greenhouses and weakened parental authority. She identifies three divides: generation, class and religion. Who can afford to disobey, and who pays the price, are questions raised within Iranian feminism itself, not a methodological warning written in Spain.
Work switched off
On 8 January, amid the uprising, Iran imposed what Filterwatch’s technical analysis suggests may have been the most comprehensive and sophisticated communications shutdown in the country’s history. After the attacks of 28 February came a near-total blackout lasting 88 days, until President Pezeshkian ordered a reopening and connectivity partly returned on 26 May. That amounted to roughly 2,093 hours, the longest nationwide shutdown in recent history according to NetBlocks. Filtered domestic connectivity remained in place afterwards.
Shutdowns are usually described as censorship, and that is what they are. But for many women they also meant losing their livelihood. In February, the feminist organisation Femena wrote that the shutdown had wiped out some of the few remaining ways in which many women, self-employed workers and technology-sector employees could meet living costs, becoming a leading cause of the collapse of small online businesses employing many women. A further report in June examined the experiences of women and queer people in digital isolation. It described online platforms as places of work, friendship, political discussion, emotional support, identity formation and collective survival — for many, among the few spaces offering any autonomy. A clothing shop or private-tutoring business run through messaging apps disappears within a week. A support network breaks. A family cannot discover whether a detained daughter is alive.
The blackout affects memory too. In December 2025, OONI and the Miaan group found that seven of 17 Persian-language women’s rights websites were blocked, including Aasoo, Feminist School and We-Change, the website of the One Million Signatures campaign. They interviewed eight activists under pseudonyms, who described lost archives and documentation. The study suggests that the authorities may be prioritising censorship of Persian-language material — the material read by local communities. An inaccessible feminist archive interrupts what one generation can pass on to the next.
Number plate, time and place
From outside, Iran is often imagined as a laboratory of algorithmic surveillance, with cameras identifying every unveiled woman. The best-known tool tells a different story. According to Filterwatch’s 2024 investigations, the police app Nazer operates only on the national network, requires police approval for each user and device, detects VPNs and asks for them to be disabled, and allows authorised users to report ‘improper’ veiling by entering a number plate, a time and a location. It does not recognise faces and is not designed to photograph them. The only photograph it accepts is of a number plate. An expanded version added ambulances and categories such as ‘riots’.
The app reveals something that talk of ‘police AI’ obscures. The state distributes the right to watch among authorised citizens; a moral judgement — what someone considers improper veiling — becomes an administrative entry capable of triggering warnings and penalties. Messages go to the ‘respected vehicle owner’; from spring 2025 they also reached the parents, brothers and husbands of women reported, according to the National Iranian American Council (NIAC). Researcher Mahdi Saremifar describes a system in Mashhad, Tehran, Shiraz and Isfahan that cross-referenced civil records to notify an individual or their family. The state writes to the family. There are no data showing whether the registered owner is usually a man, and we will not claim there are.
It would nevertheless be wrong to conclude that Iran has no biometrics. In March 2026, an investigation coordinated by Forbidden Stories with Le Monde, Der Spiegel and ZDF revealed that Iran had bought the Russian FindFace facial-recognition system in 2019. Several outlets claim it was used to identify January protesters, but nobody has been able to verify that on the ground. Saremifar’s February report for RaazNet argues that identifying people in the street does not require mature facial recognition: cross-referencing databases — digital identities, SIM registration, device identifiers and number plates — is sufficient for many purposes, even if algorithms are incomplete or fail. In March 2025, the UN fact-finding mission denounced the use of drones, reporting applications and a facial-recognition system at a university entrance; some media coverage treated this as though the entire surveillance apparatus operated in the same way. What is announced, purchased, installed and actually used against particular people are different things, and each gap needs to be examined. The myth to challenge is that of a single, all-seeing panopticon.
Artificial intelligence emerges more clearly on the other side of this story. In June, Amnesty International noted that the United States had not disclosed whether AI had been used to select the Minab target and said that, with or without AI, not all feasible precautions had been taken to prevent civilian harm. There is no substantiated evidence that Claude was involved in selecting that specific target. It has, however, been reported that US Central Command uses an AI-assisted targeting platform in this war — Palantir’s Maven Smart System — which operates with Claude. That same month, Anthropic chief executive Dario Amodei told Bloomberg that he did not know precisely how his company’s models had been used or whether Claude had played a part in the strike on the Minab school. Amodei also maintained that the principle of a human making the final decision had been respected and that the use did not breach company policy. The UN mission’s report does not mention AI. It records that a preliminary US military investigation attributed the strike to coordinates generated from outdated intelligence that still classified the school as part of the naval facility. In Lawfare, legal scholar Gabor Rona raised the possibility of insufficiently supervised reliance on AI and distinguished having a human ‘in the loop’ from exercising meaningful human control. In both cases, official language relies on the same figure: a responsible human being. It is the authorised Nazer user typing in a number plate and the unnamed person approving an air strike. For a project studying anthropology and AI, this figure deserves more attention than fantasies about machines that see everything. A disclosure is necessary: several AI models, including Anthropic’s Claude, helped prepare this article. Given that potential conflict of interest, the editorial team specifically reviewed this section.
A school in Minab
On 28 February, in the opening hours of a US–Israeli offensive that also killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that day, American cruise missiles struck Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab, Hormozgan province. It has often been described as a girls’ school, but it was not: both girls and boys aged six to thirteen attended. According to the Minab prosecutor’s final count, dated 9 April, 156 deaths were recorded: 120 pupils (73 boys and 47 girls), 26 educators, all women, seven parents, the school bus driver and a technician from a nearby pharmacy. The prosecutor also counted the six-month-old foetus of one of the educators who died, as reported by the Los Angeles Times — a detail not included in the breakdown reproduced by the UN’s independent international fact-finding mission. The mission records the official tally and separately cites independent information it considers credible indicating 157 people were killed, 123 of them aged thirteen or under, without establishing its own figure. Airwars, in its incident record USIR260228a, documents at least 155 deaths, including 123 children, and reports figures ranging from 155 to 168 across different sources. We will not combine these different counts as if they were one statistic. On the same day, another US strike killed 22 civilians — ten women and twelve men, according to local authorities cited by the mission — in a sports complex and residential area in Lamerd.
In September, the mission found reasonable grounds to believe the United States had committed two distinct war crimes: in Minab, making a civilian object the object of attack; in Lamerd, launching an indiscriminate attack. The Minab school stood about 72 metres from a Revolutionary Guards naval compound, but had operated since approximately 2016 in grounds separated by a wall, with its own entrance, children’s murals and playground; there is no indication that it was used for military purposes. The mission concluded that the school building was the intended point of impact and that, by failing to update targeting information or verify that the site was a military objective, the United States had gone beyond mere negligence. It acted with dolus eventualis, aware of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object. That is not the same as a proven intention to kill schoolchildren, nor is it an accident. The mission received no reply from the United States to its requests for information, and Washington has not made its internal investigation fully public.
We will not recount the stories of individual families here. Some spoke to the newspaper Shargh in a report by journalist Elnaz Mohammadi, translated by Femena. That does not oblige them to become an emotional hook for an article in another language. A mother searching for her son is not an argument for or against anyone.
The same UN mission concluded that the repression of the December and January protests amounted to crimes against humanity. Security forces killed on an ‘astonishing and unprecedented’ scale across all 31 provinces. A human rights organisation deemed credible by the mission has compiled the names of at least 221 children killed, the great majority boys; tens of thousands of people were detained. The government published a list of 3,038 dead, while the mission has ‘strong grounds’ to believe that the true toll is far higher, although it has not yet been able to establish it. These are two separate findings, in different legal categories, from the same investigation. Neither diminishes the other.
Family, law and the gallows
Iran publishes no complete, verifiable official series of femicide statistics. The Kurdish human rights organisation Hengaw documents cases, recording at least 207 in 2025, 45 in the first half of 2026, 12 in July, 19 in August and 23 in October. These are documented minimums within one organisation’s methodology and reach, not an official register. The figures cannot establish an annual trend: they cover periods of differing length, and in a country at war and subject to internet shutdowns the capacity to document cases also changes.
Behind these figures lies a legal mechanism. Under qisas, the right to demand punishment or grant forgiveness belongs to the victim’s family — which, in cases of domestic femicide, may also be the perpetrator’s family. Article 301 of the Islamic Penal Code exempts a father or paternal grandfather who kills a son or daughter from that punishment. The murder of teenager Romina Ashrafi by her father in 2020 made this entanglement visible, and child-protection legislation subsequently passed did not undo it. Anthropologist Arzoo Osanloo has spent more than a decade studying forgiveness and mediation in Iranian criminal law. Impunity must be explained through kinship and law, not through a supposedly uniform ‘honour culture’ that traps an entire population in a stereotype.
The state adds its own lethal violence. Hengaw counted at least 250 women shot dead by security forces during the January protests; in the first half of the year, about 5,000 women detained, of whom it could identify only 368; and nine women executed. On 13 October, Amnesty documented at least 34 executions linked to the uprising, five in a single week. In September, the UN mission warned that more than 70 people, including five women and three boys, faced imminent risk of execution. In August, rights groups reported death sentences against two women over protests in Isfahan. On 14 October, a Tehran revolutionary court again sentenced Kurdish activist Varisheh Moradi to death, after the Supreme Court had overturned her first sentence in December 2025. Moradi had refused to appear before a court whose authority she did not recognise. In July, Hengaw listed another Kurdish activist, Pakhshan Azizi, among six political prisoners facing imminent execution.
This geography is not Iranshahr’s. Much of the record of arrests, sentences and femicides is produced by organisations from the country’s margins, such as Hengaw, and then quoted without crediting where it came from. Even the movement’s slogan, Jin, Jiyan, Azadî, is Kurdish, and Jina was Mahsa Amini’s Kurdish name. Writing only ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ without saying where the words came from repeats the erasure identified by Kurdish authors.
Neither this nor that
Iranian women have spent decades thinking about the relationship between war and freedom. They do not need outsiders to explain it to them. Art historian Helia Hamedani, who works between Rome and Tehran, wrote in March, as bombs fell on the country, that women’s first protest against the new oppression took place on 8 March 1979, and that the decree making the veil compulsory in 1981 came during the war with Iraq. Her essay ends by wishing for an end to a war that, in her view, once again puts the Iranian people’s resistance at risk.
In April, a group of women activists in Tehran and Karaj signed a collective statement ‘against war and repression’, published in Persian by Akhbar Rooz. It describes both threats to their lives, names the Minab schoolchildren and the people killed by the state in January in the same text, criticises supporters of Reza Pahlavi for giving the regime pretexts and legitimising the attacks, and calls for political prisoners’ release and an end to executions. OSYAN, a collective of ‘rebellious women from Iran and Afghanistan’, called for worldwide demonstrations against the war of aggression on 15 November, with an explicit warning: ‘Our opposition to the war does not mean support for the Islamic Republic’. These are situated, specific currents, and none speaks for all Iranian women. Nor do they speak for women who support the regime, who exist and whom honest anthropology cannot erase.
Political scientist Fatemeh Sadeghi published ‘از انقلاب زنان تا دموکراسی زنانهنگر’ (‘From Women’s Revolution to a Woman-centred Democracy’) in Naghd-e Eghtesad-e Siyasi on 22 October 2022. It appeared in English in 2023 as ‘From Women’s Revolution to Jiyanist Democracy’. The word jiyan (‘life’) in the English title refers to the Kurdish slogan Jin, Jiyan, Azadî and reflects a translation choice, rather than a literal reproduction of the Persian title. Her essay raises a question that remains open in 2026, and one we are least equipped to answer from outside: what futures are Iranian women themselves imagining and debating today, under a state that executes, amid a war that bombed a school, in a country that went three months without the internet? This article cannot answer it, because it was written without asking anyone inside the country. The most it can do is avoid speaking in their name.
Methodological note
This article draws exclusively on previously published material. We have not contacted anyone inside Iran: under surveillance and communications blackouts, meaningful informed consent at a distance cannot be guaranteed, and a message could endanger its recipient. We do not publish faces, names of victims’ relatives or of people detained unless those details have already been made public by the individuals or their organisations, nor do we publish instructions for bypassing censorship. Some tools circulated during shutdowns are spyware.
Figures are attributed to their sources, dates and standards of verification. The UN’s findings are those of a fact-finding mission, not court judgements. Hengaw’s and Amnesty’s numbers are documented minimums. Figures issued by Iran’s government and Minab’s local authorities are presented as such.
Further reading
- Fariba Adelkhah, La revolución bajo el velo. Mujer iraní y régimen islamista, Edicions Bellaterra, Barcelona, 1996, translated by J. Vivanco. One of the few anthropological studies of Iranian women translated into Spanish. Adelkhah was detained in Iran from June 2019 to February 2023.
- Azadeh Kian, Rethinking Gender, Ethnicity and Religion in Iran: An Intersectional Approach to National Identity, I.B. Tauris, 2023. Discusses women in Baluchistan and Golestan using more than 7,000 surveys and around 100 interviews.
- Fatemeh Karimi, Women of Komala: Gender and Revolution in Iranian Kurdistan, Pluto Press, 2025, translated from French by Katharine Hodgkin and Janet Biehl. On women combatants in Komala between 1979 and 1991.
- Azad Rahim Hajiagha and Wendelmoet Hamelink, ‘Kurdish women’s activism in Iran: struggle for re-conquest of the public sphere’, Identities, 32(5), 2025, pp. 695–714; and the open-access collection Enacting Citizenship: Kurdish Women’s Resilience, Activism and Creativity, Palgrave Macmillan, 2025.
- Manijeh Moradian, ‘Decolonial Diasporas: Iranian Feminist Solidarity in Global Context’, Iranian Studies, 58(4), 2025, pp. 1026–1034. Feminist solidarity independent both of the regime and of foreign-imposed projects for political change.
- Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, Harvard University Press, 2013. We have not found a Spanish edition.
Sources
- Abu-Lughod, L. (2013). Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Harvard University Press. Publisher.
- Ahmadi Khorasani, N. (5 May 2023). «حجاب اجباری، جنبش ژینا و طبقهی متوسط» [Compulsory veiling, the Jina movement and the middle class]. Aasoo. Persian original.
- Airwars. (2026, updated 10 de November). Incident USIR260228a: Minab school, 28 February. Incident record.
- Amnesty International. (25 June 2026). «USA: Four months after horrific Minab school airstrike, accountability delayed». Statement.
- Amnesty International. (13 October 2026). «Irán: El hecho de que en una semana haya habido cinco ejecuciones arbitrarias relacionadas con las protestas debe impulsar una acción global». Statement.
- Associated Press. (16 September 2026). «Iran hesitates to clamp down on defiance of headscarf rules as war and economic pressures mount». Feature.
- Axios. (28 February 2026). «Iranian state media confirms Supreme Leader Khamenei is dead». News report.
- Bloomberg Law. (10 June 2026). «Anthropic CEO Doesn’t Know If Claude Used in Iran School Strike» (K. Manson y E. Chang). Interview and news report.
- Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (14 February 2025). Iran: Dress codes, including legislation, enforcement and criminal penalties (IRN202201.E). Report on Article 638.
- Dawn / AFP. (15 March 2025). «Iran using tech to enforce women’s dress code, claims UN report». News report on the UN fact-finding mission’s report.
- «Do you hear our voices? A collective statement against war and repression, by women activists inside the country». (21 April 2026). Statement by activists in Tehran and Karaj; published in Persian by Akhbar Rooz on 22 April and translated into English by Global Movement News on 25 April. English republication by Global Movement, 25 de April de 2026.
- Femena. (5 February 2026). From War to Protests: Recurrent Internet Shutdowns and the Gradual Displacement of Women from the Labor Market. Report.
- Femena. (10 June 2026). Internet Shutdowns in Iran and the Gendered Experience of Digital Isolation. Report.
- Filterwatch. (7 October 2024). «Iran’s Nazer App Aims to Expand State Surveillance and Control». Technical analysis.
- Filterwatch. (16 January 2026). «Total Blackout: A Technical Breakdown of the January 2026 Shutdown». Technical analysis.
- Hamedani, H. (16 March 2026). «From March 8». NERO Editions. Article.
- Hengaw. (8 March 2026). Hengaw statistical report on violations of women’s rights marking March 8, 2026. Report.
- Hengaw. (7 July 2026). Hengaw statistical report on violations of women’s rights in Iran during the first half of 2026. Report.
- Hengaw. (30 July 2026). «Six female political prisoners face execution in Iran; two others at risk of renewed death sentences». News report.
- Hengaw. (5 August 2026). Hengaw documents widespread violations of women’s rights in Iran during July 2026. Report.
- Hengaw. (6 September 2026). Hengaw monthly report on women’s rights violations in Iran – August 2026. Report.
- Hengaw. (15 October 2026). «Kurdish political prisoner Varisheh Moradi sentenced to death for second time in Tehran». News report.
- Hengaw. (3 November 2026). Hengaw monthly report on women’s rights violations in Iran – October 2026. Report.
- Iran International. (9 September 2026). «War conditions curb mandatory hijab crackdown, Iranian official says». News report.
- Iran International. (9 November 2026). «Iranian doctor prosecuted for discussing rise in single motherhood». News report: single news source.
- Iran International. (10 November 2026). «Iran arrests several in hijab crackdown on popular Tehran street». News report.
- Keshavarznia, N., Millet, D., Rashidi, A., Xynou, M., Gulati, M., Filastò, A., and Yachmeneva, E. (18 December 2025). «How Internet Censorship Impacts the Women’s Rights Movement in Iran: Insights from OONI Data and Activist Interviews». OONI y Miaan. Study.
- Le Monde / Forbidden Stories. (4 March 2026). «How Iran secretly acquired facial recognition technology through a Russian company». Investigation.
- Los Angeles Times. (6 May 2026). «Iranians recount desperate attempts to find survivors after school bombing» (Z. Saberi). Feature sobre el recuento oficial de Minab.
- Mohajerin, A., and Rashidi, A. (5 January 2024). «Nazer App: How Iran Is Using Technology to Suppress Women’s Rights». Filterwatch. Investigation.
- Mohammadi, E. (3 April 2026). «The Children of Minab» [translation of the report published in Shargh]. Femena. Translated text. The report’s figure (168 deaths) predates the prosecutor’s final count of 9 April.
- United Nations, Human Rights Council. (September de 2026). Official transcript of the 20th meeting of the 63rd session (fact-finding mission statement). Transcript.
- United Nations, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran. (September de 2026). Report A/HRC/63/61. Document record. Report text.
- NIAC. (1 May 2025). «SMS Hijab Policing Escalates in Iran: From Street Warnings to Family Alerts». Article.
- NIAC. (31 October 2025). «Sharifeh Mohammadi’s Death Sentence Commuted to 30 Years: Human Rights Concerns Remain». Article.
- Osanloo, A. (2020). Forgiveness Work: Mercy, Law, and Victims’ Rights in Iran. Princeton University Press. Publisher. https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691172040.001.0001
- OSYAN. (November de 2026). Call for worldwide anti-war actions on 15 November. Call reproduced by Free Iran’s Political Prisoners Now, 4 de November.
- Islamic Republic of Iran. (2013). Islamic Penal Code, Article 301 (general conditions of qisas). Persian text.
- Rona, G. (28 September 2026). «Parsing the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s Report on U.S. Strikes in Iran». Lawfare. Legal analysis.
- Sadeghi, F. (22 October 2022). «از انقلاب زنان تا دموکراسی زنانهنگر» [From women’s revolution to a woman-centred democracy]. Naghd-e Eghtesad-e Siyasi. Persian original.
- Sadeghi, F. (2023). «From Women’s Revolution to Jiyanist Democracy» (S. Shohadaei, trans.). Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 19(3), 458–468. https://doi.org/10.1215/15525864-10815679
- Saremifar, M. (8 February 2026). «Policymaking and Institutional Mapping of Surveillance and Interception of Citizens under the Islamic Republic of Iran». RaazNet. Investigation.
- Taipei Times / AFP. (14 November 2026). «Iranian women defy restrictions to embrace freedom». News report.
- The Guardian. (26 May 2026). «Iran’s access to global internet starts to resume after 88-day blackout». Report including NetBlocks data.
- The National. (29 September 2026). «Iranian court rejects appeal of singer sentenced to 74 lashes». News report.
- The New Arab. (29 August 2020). «Iranian man who beheaded teenage daughter gets nine-year sentence». News report on the Romina Ashrafi case.
- The Next Web. (10 June 2026). «Anthropic’s CEO says he doesn’t know if Claude was used in the Iran school strike that killed 120 children». News report.
- Times of Israel. (31 August 2026). «Iran sentences two women to death over 2026 protests, rights groups say». News report.