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The Asian week ends on the Korean peninsula on 20 November, Transgender Day of Remembrance. On Saturday 21 November, five organisations are coordinating a Trans March in Seoul, starting at Bosingak. One of them is the Korea Cyber Sexual Violence Response Center (KCSVRC), which held a press conference outside Google Korea’s headquarters in September after information about victims of sexual imagery had been published online. That intersection is at the heart of this radar: who can turn what happened to them into evidence, and who can challenge the records others make of their lives? In the South, the press, parliament and civil society organisations can hold a multinational company to account, yet asking for an image to be removed can itself expose the person making the request. In the North, there is scarcely any public means of demanding accountability and, according to Korea Future, cited by the United Nations Special Rapporteur, the bodies of women forcibly returned from China are often treated as evidence during interrogation. We follow women writers and researchers who have considered these questions from Seoul, the diaspora and their experience of having left the North. Much of what we cite has not been translated into Spanish.

1. The women who began removing images

Between 2019 and 2020, a small team of women university students calling themselves 추적단 불꽃 (the ‘Flame tracking team’) spent months following Telegram chat rooms where women and minors were coerced into producing sexual material which was then sold. Their investigations helped expose the Nth Room case, which sent its principal perpetrators to prison and prompted the largest public petition then submitted to the presidency. One of the investigators, Won Eun-ji, published 불꽃이 꺼지지 않게 (May the Flame Never Go Out, Dolgorae) on 1 September 2026, reflecting on the six years that followed. The book places deepfakes within a digital environment in Korea stretching back to Soranet, a site hosting sexual material launched in 1999. It also describes the cost of supporting a victim for years: the waiting, exhaustion and precautions taken by an activist who does not want to become a target. It has not been translated into Spanish.

The chronology of seeking redress matters. KCSVRC began supporting victims of online sexual violence in 2017. The public support centre, now overseen by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and the Korean Institute for the Promotion of Women’s Human Rights, began operating in 2018. Looking for an image, documenting it, requesting its removal and searching for it again when it resurfaced were already part of feminist organisations’ work by the time the state opened its own service.

The centre’s report on 2025, published in April 2026, conveys the scale of this work. It supported 10,637 people, including 8,019 women, and 77.6% were aged between 10 and 29. The number of new victims fell by 10.3%, while the number still receiving support from previous years rose by 26.3% — a sign that the harm persists as images continue to circulate. Of 352,103 services provided, 90.3% involved assistance with content removal. This measures the centre’s work, not how many images actually disappeared. Cases involving synthetic or manipulated images rose by 16.8% to 1,616, of which 1,581 involved women. In 29% of records concerning the relationship to the perpetrator, the perpetrator could not be identified. Of the 26,658 sites examined during removal work, 70.8% had servers in the United States — a reminder that the infrastructure through which these images circulate is not confined to Korea.

To ask for an image to be removed, you have to identify yourself. On 25 August 2026, the government learnt that requests many victims had sent to Google to remove images — including their names, workplaces and telephone numbers, the images’ URLs and descriptions of the harm — had been published on the website of an external project with which the company shared these requests. The ministry asked the media not to name the website, to avoid further exposure, and we do not name it here. Hankyoreh reported the incident on 8 September. The following day, Google gave a written undertaking not to share removal requests received from Korea. On 11 September, Minister Won Min-kyung said the company would have to face legal responsibility if a violation were confirmed; the Personal Information Protection Commission was already investigating. By 1 October, the authorities had identified 15 affected people. At a parliamentary audit on 12 October, Google Korea’s head, Yoon Koo, said the information had been blocked within 24 hours. In the same hearing, this claim was challenged using information provided by the company itself, indicating that the notification had arrived on 25 August and the website address on 27 August. On 28 October, Yoon apologised on Google’s behalf before the gender equality committee.

The organisations offered their own reading. On 14 September, KCSVRC and around twenty feminist groups held a press conference outside Google Korea’s headquarters under the slogan ‘leaking removal requests is tantamount to distributing the material’. Such a request contains the victim’s name, contact details and the location of the image they want taken down. When the request circulates, it reproduces the harm it was intended to stop.

Two weeks later, on 30 September, KCSVRC announced that it would not accept new enquiries between 1 October 2026 and 30 July 2027. It will continue working on existing cases and describes the pause as a chance to reorganise before its tenth anniversary. It directs people needing assistance in Korea to the national centre (02-735-8994) and the 1366 helpline. The notice does not link the pause to the leak. The break is a reminder that feminist infrastructures of redress also need time and resources.

2. Making, detecting, punishing

In August 2024, it emerged that sexual images made using photographs of female classmates and teachers were being circulated on Telegram in schools and universities. By 8 November 2024, the Ministry of Education had counted 948 victims in educational institutions: 908 students, 36 teachers and four other people. It has published no new figures since then. The National Assembly amended the law on sexual offences on 26 September 2024, and since 16 October possessing, buying, storing or viewing this material has carried a sentence of up to three years’ imprisonment. Creating or distributing it carries up to seven years.

The hidden cameras that prompted major women’s protests in 2018 recorded real bodies without consent. The Nth Rooms coerced women into producing material. A deepfake creates a sexual image of someone who was never photographed in that situation. These practices share modes of circulation and forms of harm, but not their techniques or their victims’ experiences; the law has had to respond to them separately. In February 2026, a team led by Inha Cha released a preprint tracing the genealogy of this violence in South Korea. It identifies four stages, from the early internet in the 1990s to the deepfake scandals, and traces how misogyny is reconfigured with each technology as the laws change.

On 16 November, the National Police Agency reported on its annual campaign, which ran from 17 November 2025 to 31 October 2026. It recorded 4,411 cases of digital sexual violence, a figure similar to the previous year’s, while deepfake cases fell by roughly a quarter. Police identified 3,430 suspects in 3,267 cases, fewer than the previous year, and 148 were held on remand, compared with 221. Undercover operations, by contrast, more than tripled to 879. According to the judicial information system, adolescents accounted for 44.6% of the 3,479 digital sexual violence suspects in a similar period, and more than half in deepfake cases. These are suspects, not people convicted of offences, and the percentage tells us something both about what adolescents can access and where the police direct their attention. On 10 September, the Supreme Court upheld the life sentence imposed on the leader of Jagyungdan, a Telegram-based sexual exploitation network which, according to press reports, had 261 victims of different genders, including minors.

Automation is also being used to locate images. Since April, the national centre has used an automated system to scan around the clock for child sexual abuse material. Between April and September, it detected 96,210 items and requested their removal, with a person reviewing every alert before it was sent. The average number of detections made per surveillance team member each day rose from 20.8 to 202.1. What happens to each image afterwards depends on platforms and servers beyond the centre’s control. South Korea’s AI Basic Act has also been in force since 22 January 2026. It requires providers of generative AI services to disclose their use and label the content they produce, with a visible mark on deepfakes that are difficult to distinguish from real images. Fines of up to 30 million won will not be imposed for at least a year.

Meanwhile, a bill proposes punishing images without an identifiable victim. In September 2025, Heo Young of the governing Democratic Party introduced an amendment providing for up to seven years in prison for using AI to create sexual images of ‘virtual characters or representations that could be perceived as real people’, according to the bill’s wording, and up to three years for possessing or viewing them. The text does not require the image to resemble any particular person or for a victim to exist. The initiative followed an acquittal in which the prosecution could not prove that a woman shown in an image existed. Weekly Kyunghyang reconstructed the trial and, according to the defence, investigators had not traced the image’s origin: the case therefore involved a failure of proof, whereas the bill extends criminal liability to figures with no real-world counterpart. When the bill reached a subcommittee of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee on 27 July 2026, it drew criticism for excessive punishment, particularly from online communities aligned with the party itself. We have found no subsequent vote. Heo argues that the amendment closes a legal gap in a growing market for such images; critics question which legal interest it protects and whether the sentence is proportionate. What, precisely, is being protected when there is no identifiable person behind the image? That question remains open.

In 2024, the Korean Association of Women’s Studies initiated 디지털 시대의 페미니즘 (Feminism in the Digital Age, Hankyoreh Publishing), whose chapters address these same problems. Kim Ae-ra asks how deepfake images relate to the real; Lee Ji-eun and Im So-yeon write about ‘situated’ women developers and feminist artificial intelligence; Lee Min-ju reconstructs campaigns demanding the dismissal of women accused of being feminists; and Son Hee-jeong examines what she calls ‘gore masculinity’. The book has not been translated into Spanish. Its chapters shift the discussion from the tool itself to who defines the technical problem and who bears its consequences.

3. The body as a case file

Almost everything known about women in North Korea reaches us from outside the country, often years late. Report A/81/370 by UN Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Salmón, dated 14 September and presented to a General Assembly committee on 27 October, draws on testimony from people who have left the country, civil society organisations and official documentation. In 2025, 223 people arrived in South Korea from the North, 198 of them women; almost all had left before the border closures of 2020. In the first half of 2026, 63 people arrived, including 59 women, according to the Ministry of Unification. These figures describe the people who managed to reach the South; they do not, on their own, explain why more women arrive. The report does explain why most people forcibly returned from China are women, attributing this to women’s role in supporting their families and their greater exposure to sexual exploitation.

The same report describes surveillance intensifying through new cameras, compulsory electronic payments and the inminban, the neighbourhood monitoring system. It also describes restrictions on small-scale private trading that reduce the availability of cash, and a rice price that in March 2026 had risen by 176% over a year. Women have sustained much of this small-scale commerce since the famine of the 1990s. It is reasonable to think that these measures affect them profoundly, although the report does not say so. None of the sources consulted attributes this surveillance to artificial intelligence systems.

The report’s discussion of the gender dimensions of the death penalty begins by acknowledging that comprehensive data are unavailable. It records testimony concerning sexual violence by men in positions of authority and in detention. Such risks begin, it says, at the moment of arrest because, according to Korea Future, women’s bodies, reproductive histories, family roles and experiences across the border are often treated as evidence during interrogation (our translation into Spanish in the original edition). It also records an allegation that the Special Rapporteur transmitted to Pyongyang without receiving a response. Following a public trial on 31 August 2024, two women forcibly returned from China, both trafficking victims, were reportedly sentenced to death for offences including trafficking, prostitution and ‘offending the dignity of persons’, and executed the same day. Nine others were reportedly sentenced to life imprisonment. The Special Rapporteur asks what it means to punish trafficking victims for actions arising from their exploitation. She also notes that, according to the North Korean state itself, women accounted for 11.9% of judges and lawyers in 2016. At the end of October, UN experts recalled that, three years after China resumed mass forced returns, there was no information about the whereabouts of those sent back. In October 2025, Human Rights Watch counted at least 406 people returned since 2024.

On 29 September, the Korean organisation NKDB published Across Borders, on trafficking of North Korean women into and within China. According to a summary by UpRights, which advised on the legal analysis, the report argues that classifying these women as ‘illegal economic migrants’ rather than refugees or trafficking victims may exclude them from effective legal protection systems and increase their vulnerability to exploitation.

The name used for people who leave the North is also disputed in the South. Since January 2026, the Ministry of Unification has used 북향민, ‘people whose original home is in the North’, alongside the legal term and in place of 탈북민, ‘people who escaped the North’. It presents this as a way to improve their social image and integration. The Central Council of people who have left the North rejects the change because escape is part of their identity. It filed a complaint with the UN office in Seoul and, on 12 November, as a bill to make the term legally recognised reached parliament, held a rally calling for the minister’s resignation. We use ‘people who have left the North’ here.

Some women have written about this history through experience and research. Seol Song-ah, a journalist and researcher who left the North and writes under a pseudonym, published 여자는 죽지 않았다 (Women Have Not Died, approximate translation, Bom Alarm) in 2025. She explained that she wrote it because the South’s image of the North was limited to criticism of the regime and human rights issues, and she wanted to tell how women driven into the market to earn a living reinvented their own value. Her writing has also attracted critical readings. In a 2025 article, Joung Ju A of Kangwon National University reads those texts in the light of the author’s trajectory: in the North she was a 돈주 (donju), one of those who grew wealthy through trading during the famine. Joung argues that the feminist awakening in these texts ultimately becomes absorbed into market logic and that the success story culminates in the acquisition of a patriarchal power that replaces men’s power. She proposes bringing feminism together with degrowth. From an economics perspective, Minju Park and Jiyoung Choi published a study in June 2026 on the family economy after the famine, based on interviews with thirteen women and three men who had left the North. In their sample, women’s trading supports the household without displacing male authority — as their title puts it, ‘She Sells, He Guards’.

Kim Sung-kyung, a researcher in the South, interviewed around 150 North Korean women in her work and used this material for 살아남은 여자들은 세계를 만든다 (Women Who Survived Make Worlds, Changbi, 2023). The book brings together the lives of heroines of North Korean propaganda and those of women who left the North, ethnic Korean women from China and Korean women from Japan whom she met in China and at the border, adding a writer’s imagination. In 2022, in the journal of the Korean Association of Women’s Studies, she had analysed the colonial gaze and gendered narratives in the memoirs of North Korean women circulated through global popular culture. The historian Suzy Kim, meanwhile, reconstructed in Among Women across Worlds (2023, open access) how North Korean women’s organisations participated in the international women’s movement during the Cold War. None of these works claims to describe the present-day lives of all women in the North. The thinking accessible to us is written from migration or from the South; we have not found feminist thought published inside the country.

4. Remembering without commemorating

On 20 November, people around the world remember trans people murdered or killed by violence and discrimination. This year, the Korean trans organisation 조각보 is marking the date with an event entitled «’추모’하지 않으며 보내는 법», roughly ‘How to Say Goodbye Without “Commemorating”’. Rather than conventional mourning texts, it invites writing that evokes the life of a person who has gone without reducing that life to violence. The proposal asks who decides how a trans life is remembered, and whether violence must occupy the entire memory. The website collecting the texts prohibits copying, capturing or gathering them to train artificial intelligence. We describe the initiative but do not reproduce its texts. The prohibition also raises a question about who owns a memory when any text may end up in a database.

On Saturday 21 November, the Seoul Trans March sets off from Bosingak at 3 pm. It is called by a coalition of groups and coordinated by five organisations: 커뮤니T, 트랜스해방전선, 무지개행동, 행동하는성소수자인권연대 and KCSVRC. The organisers recall that ten years ago the movement held its first joint vigil on this date, followed by annual gatherings in Itaewon, and that this year’s format changes to broaden alliances in the face of growing anti-gender movements. The fact that an organisation working against digital sexual violence is coordinating the march represents a concrete alliance between two struggles often considered separately.

The lawyer Park Han-hee, from the human rights lawyers’ group 희망을만드는법, recalled in Law Times this month that twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court recognised changes to the sex recorded in official documents. She explained that the general criteria still require surgery, that some lower courts have found this unconstitutional, and that, until the Supreme Court rules, decisions vary from court to court. A study published in May by Myung-Hwa Lee, Myeung-Chan Kim and Sun-Joung Leigh An, based on interviews with six trans women, describes nunchi — constant attention to signals from one’s surroundings — as uncounted safety labour. This is a small sample and does not allow for generalisation, but it uses a Korean word to name something statistics overlook.

In South Korea, some feminist currents exclude trans women, and Korean scholarship has studied them closely. In 2024, Kim Bo-Myung examined the gender politics of trans-exclusionary feminism in the journal of the Korean Association of Women’s Studies. Woori Han, at the University of Exeter, published a study in March 2026 on how certain strands of popular online feminism developed into trans exclusion.

The march’s call refers to anti-gender movements, and the state has also changed its terminology. On 1 October 2025, Lee Jae-myung’s government changed the Korean name of the Ministry of Women and Family to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, gave it responsibility for equality in employment and, at the president’s direction, created a division dedicated to what it calls ‘reverse discrimination’ against men. Soohyun Christine Lee examined the turn towards modern sexism among some young men around the 2022 presidential election, linking it to economic insecurity, anti-gender politics and right-wing populism.

In March, 한국여성의전화 (Korea Women’s Hotline) published its annual tally. In 2025, at least 137 women were killed by men with whom they were or had been in intimate relationships, and at least 252 survived attempted killings. The organisation compiles these figures from press reports because no official statistic records them, and it calls on the state to produce one. Throughout this week, in Turkey, India, China and South Korea, we have encountered women counting what the state does not count, or searching for what others want to erase. The approach of 25 November leaves a question: who has to prove, again and again, that what happened to them happened, and who decides what counts as evidence?

Sources

Introduction and section 1

  • Won Eun-ji, 불꽃이 꺼지지 않게: N번방 이후 6년, 추적단 불꽃의 끝나지 않은 이야기, Dolgorae, 1 September 2026 (KOBIC catalogue entry) · mediatoday.co.kr
  • KCSVRC, ‘한사성 신규상담 일시중단 안내’, 30 September 2026 · cyber-lion.com
  • KCSVRC, announcement of its 14 September 2026 press conference outside Google Korea, published 11 September · womennews.co.kr
  • Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and Korean Institute for the Promotion of Women’s Human Rights, 2025 디지털성범죄 피해자 지원 보고서, April 2026, as reported by CBS Nocut News, 16 April 2026 · nocutnews.co.kr
  • Ministry of Women and Family, ‘중앙 디성센터 확대 출범’, 16 April 2025 (the centre began operating in 2018) · korea.kr
  • SBS Biz, Digital Daily and Hankyung on Minister Won Min-kyung’s appearance, 11 September 2026; MTN, 7 and 13 October 2026; SBS Biz on the audit of 28 October 2026 · lawtv.kr · mtn.co.kr · etoday.co.kr

Section 2

  • Ministry of Education, tenth survey of deepfake victims in educational institutions, November 2024 (as reported by MBC) · imnews.imbc.com
  • Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, Article 14-2, amendment effective 16 October 2024 · law.go.kr
  • Inha Cha, Yeonju Jang, Haesoo Kim, Joo Young Park, Seora Park and EunJeong Cheon, ‘“My body is not your Porn”: Identifying Trends of Harm and Oppression through a Sociotechnical Genealogy of Digital Sexual Violence in South Korea’, arXiv preprint 2602.16853, 18 February 2026 · arxiv.org
  • National Police Agency, summary of its cyber sexual violence campaign, 16 November 2026 (Korea Herald and Korean press); statement of 13 August 2026 · heraldcorp.com
  • Hankyung and YTN on the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Jagyungdan case, 10 September 2026 · lawtimes.co.kr
  • Yonhap, ‘S. Korea employs AI to boost detection, removal of child sexual abuse material’, 10 November 2026 · koreatimes.co.kr
  • AI Basic Act (인공지능 기본법), in force since 22 January 2026 · law.go.kr
  • Jeong Yong-in, ‘민주당 주도 발의 ‘AI 성적영상물법’ 왜 논란됐을까’, Weekly Kyunghyang, 29 July 2026; The Korea Times, 11 August 2026 · weekly.khan.co.kr · koreatimes.co.kr
  • Korean Association of Women’s Studies (initiator), Heo Yun, Son Hee-jeong and others, 디지털 시대의 페미니즘: 딥페이크 성범죄부터 온라인 담론 투쟁까지, 더 나은 미래를 위한 새로운 언어들, Hankyoreh Publishing, 2024 · ebook-product.kyobobook.co.kr

Section 3

  • Elizabeth Salmón, Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, United Nations, A/81/370, 14 September 2026 · docs.un.org
  • Human Rights Watch, ‘UN Report Highlights North Korea’s Deepening Repression’, 9 November 2026; ‘China: No Letup in Forced Returns to North Korea’, 15 October 2025 · hrw.org · hrw.org
  • Ministry of Unification, arrivals in the first half of 2026, 6 August 2026 (News1, The Korea Times) · segye.com
  • UpRights, ‘NKDB Publishes “Across Borders: Addressing Trafficking and Structural Vulnerabilities of North Korean Women”’, 5 October 2026 · uprights.org
  • Newsis and koreancenter.or.kr on the dispute over the term 북향민, July and November 2026 · heraldcorp.com · sbs.co.kr
  • Seol Song-ah, 여자는 죽지 않았다, Bom Alarm, 2025; interview in Segye Ilbo, 13 May 2025 · baumealame.com · segye.com
  • Joung Ju A, ‘탈북작가 설송아의 ‘여성주의적’ 글쓰기와 북한의 장마당 자본주의’, 여성문학연구, 66, 2025, pp. 77–103 · doi:10.15686/fkl.2025..66.77
  • Minju Park and Jiyoung Choi, ‘She Sells, He Guards: The Gendered Family Economy in Post-Famine North Korea’, Asian Women, 42 (2), 2026 · doi:10.64446/aw.2026.6.42.2.307
  • Kim Sung-kyung, 살아남은 여자들은 세계를 만든다: 분단의 나라에서 여성으로 살아간다는 것, Changbi, 2023 · weekly.khan.co.kr
  • Kim Sung Kyung, ‘Global Popular Culture and Stories of Survivors: Colonial Gaze and Gendered Narrative in Memoirs of North Korean Women’, Journal of Korean Women’s Studies, 38 (2), 2022, pp. 1–32 · doi:10.30719/jkws.2022.06.38.2.1
  • Suzy Kim, Among Women across Worlds: North Korea in the Global Cold War, Cornell University Press, 2023 · library.oapen.org

Section 4 and conclusion

  • 조각보, ‘’추모’하지 않으며 보내는 법 — 2026 TDOR 메모리얼 파티’, 20 November 2026 · transgender.or.kr
  • HIV/AIDS인권행동 알, ‘알도 함께 주최합니다, 〈2026 트랜스마치〉’, 1 November 2026 · rainbowaction.kr
  • Park Han-hee, column on twenty years of legal recognition of changes to sex registration, Law Times, November 2026 · lawtimes.co.kr
  • Myung-Hwa Lee, Myeung-Chan Kim and Sun-Joung Leigh An, ‘Nunchi as safety labor: a phenomenological study of transgender women’s survival in South Korea’, International Journal of Transgender Health, 9 May 2026 · doi:10.1080/26895269.2026.2669181
  • Kim Bo-Myung, ‘트랜스젠더배제적 급진페미니즘의 ‘젠더’ 정치학에 대한 소고’, 한국여성학, 40 (4), 2024, pp. 97–128 · doi:10.30719/jkws.2024.12.40.4.97
  • Woori Han, ‘The rise of trans-exclusionary feminism in South Korea: popular feminism and the mediation of women’s bodies’, Feminist Media Studies, 3 March 2026 · doi:10.1080/14680777.2026.2635497
  • Newsis and Seoul Shinmun on the creation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, September and October 2025 · newsis.com
  • Soohyun Christine Lee, ‘Anti-Gender Politics, Economic Insecurity, and Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of Modern Sexism among Young Men in South Korea’, Social Politics, 32 (3), 2025, pp. 584–611 (online since October 2024) · doi:10.1093/sp/jxae016
  • 한국여성의전화, ‘2025년 분노의 게이지’, 6 March 2026 (as reported by Newsis) · newsis.com

Further reading

  • Suzy Kim, Among Women across Worlds: North Korea in the Global Cold War, Cornell University Press, 2023. Open access in English. On North Korean women’s involvement in the international women’s movement during the Cold War. · library.oapen.org
  • Hyun-Joo Lim, North Korean Women and Defection: Human Rights Violations and Activism, Bristol University Press, 2024. On the violence experienced by, and activism of, women who have left the North and live in the United Kingdom. · policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk
  • Cho Nam-joo, Kim Ji-young, Born 1982, translated into Spanish by Joo Hasun, Alfaguara, 2019. A novel which introduced many readers outside Korea to the everyday inequalities experienced by an ordinary South Korean woman; the only work on this list translated into Spanish.