Feminisms, violence and possible futures
The answers that disappear
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We asked nine AI models, four of them Chinese, about feminism in China, in Spanish and Chinese. Twice, text appeared on the screen and then disappeared.

Special series ‘Feminisms, violence and possible futures’
On the night of 17 November, we asked DeepSeek, in Spanish, whether Weibo and other Chinese platforms delete feminist posts or accounts. The interface shows the model’s reasoning as it works, and we saved it a few seconds after submitting the question. DeepSeek had written that the question was sensitive and called for ‘factual and balanced information’. It had found 29 results and opened five pages, including an academic article, a South China Morning Post report and two Chinese-language reports about accounts being closed for ‘inciting gender antagonism’. It began summarising them and noted that the Cyberspace Administration of China includes the ‘promotion of extreme feminism’ in its internet clean-up campaigns. When we looked again, all of this had vanished from the screen. In its place was a single line: ‘Sorry, that is beyond my current scope. Let’s talk about something else.’
The information DeepSeek found is accurate. On 19 January 2025, the Cyberspace Administration launched its ‘Qinglang’ campaign for Chinese New Year, targeting six types of content. The first was ‘provoking extreme confrontation’. It included, in the same sentence, ‘deliberately exaggerating and promoting topics such as not marrying or having children, or opposing marriage and childbearing, spreading extreme feminism and inciting gender antagonism’. The record shows that DeepSeek found and summarised this information before the screen replaced it with a refusal.
What follows is what we saw that night when we put the same six questions to nine models, in Spanish and Chinese. This was a test conducted on a single night, with limitations set out at the end, and what it reveals connects to what Chinese feminists have experienced over the past decade.
Ten years after the five
In March 2015, just before International Women’s Day on 8 March, police arrested five young women in Beijing, Guangzhou and Hangzhou who were preparing a sticker campaign against sexual harassment on public transport. They spent 37 days in detention and were released on bail in April after an international campaign. They were never brought to trial, but remained under suspicion and surveillance over the following year. The ‘Feminist Five’ became the symbol of a generation of young, urban, educated activists who had learnt to engage in politics through small, highly visible actions. The journalist and sociologist Leta Hong Fincher told their story in Betraying Big Brother (2018), arguing that this grassroots movement was, in her view, one of the greatest challenges to the Chinese regime.
What followed was a gradual closing down of space. Feminist Voices (女权之声), the platform Lü Pin had founded in 2009 and which supported those activists, was shut down on Weibo and WeChat in March 2018. That same year, China’s #MeToo movement began at universities. When Weibo temporarily blocked the hashtag #MeTooInChina around 19 January, users replaced it with 米兔, ‘rice bunny’, pronounced ‘mi tu’, like MeToo in English. Researcher Jing Zeng analysed more than 36,000 posts from that campaign, identified 48 cases involving allegations of sexual violence or harassment, and documented the strategies users employed to evade censorship. The best-known case was that of Zhou Xiaoxuan, known as Xianzi, who accused a state television presenter of sexual harassment. A Beijing court ruled in 2021 that her evidence was insufficient and rejected her appeal in 2022. In late May 2026, Weibo permanently closed her account, which had attracted around 700,000 followers over eight years. The platform’s notice referred only to complaints that she had breached laws and community rules, and some Chinese websites celebrated it as a deserved punishment.
Journalist Huang Xueqin, one of the people who helped drive that #MeToo movement, was arrested in September 2021, just as she was preparing to travel to the United Kingdom to study. In June 2024, a court in Guangzhou sentenced her to five years for ‘inciting subversion of state power’, alongside labour activist Wang Jianbing, who received three and a half years. Wang was released in March 2025 and remains deprived of political rights for three years. Huang was released on 18 September 2026, having served her sentence, with an additional four-year deprivation of political rights. That month, the organisation Rights Practice warned that she would continue to face restrictions on speaking, publishing and organising long after her release. There is no reliable information about her present circumstances, and we will not speculate about them.
We are not reporting where each of the five lives today. Their work does not depend on that information, and publishing it would serve them no purpose.
The state that protects and monitors
It would be a mistake to tell this story solely as one of a state persecuting feminism. Since 1949, the Chinese state has spoken of equality between women and men, and laws enshrine that principle. Its domestic violence law has been in force since 2016, and its Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests was amended in 2022. In Finding Women in the State (2016), historian Wang Zheng showed that, in the early years of the People’s Republic, socialist feminists within the Party itself and the Women’s Federation fought for equality through state institutions, often against their male colleagues. That ‘state feminism’ is a genuine legacy and helps explain how the government can present itself both as the guarantor of women’s rights and as a monitor of feminists.
The line between those two roles has become increasingly explicit. Weibo announcements and Cyberspace Administration campaigns do not speak simply of feminism. They speak of ‘inciting gender antagonism’ (挑动性别对立), a category used to close accounts since 2021, and of ‘extreme feminism’. In August 2025, according to the South China Morning Post, Weibo permanently closed an account with 129,000 followers for ‘persistently stigmatising the opposite sex’ and posting ‘extreme anti-marriage rhetoric’. In the same round, it closed another account whose name itself insulted feminists, for insulting the opposite sex, and temporarily suspended a third with more than 650,000 followers. This language of moderation puts women’s demands and attacks against women on the same plane, as if they were two sides of a single confrontation, and reserves the role of referee for the platform and the state.
Communications researcher Angela Xiao Wu and sociologist Yige Dong proposed in 2019 that we speak of ‘made-in-China feminisms’, in the plural, and identified two strands of discontent among young urban women, which they termed entrepreneurial and non-cooperative. Their work predates the 2025 campaign, but helps us see that the latter targets a particular expression of that discontent: women who decide not to marry or have children. In 2025, 7.92 million babies were born in China, the lowest figure since 1949, and the population fell for a fourth consecutive year. When births become a matter of state concern, an individual decision not to have children takes on a political meaning.
The case that caused the greatest outrage in these years shows both sides at once. In late January 2022, a video circulated of a woman, the mother of eight children, chained by the neck in a hut in Fengxian county, Xuzhou. Local authorities initially denied that trafficking was involved and changed their account several times under public pressure. A provincial investigation concluded in February that she had been taken from Yunnan through deception in 1998 and sold several times, and disciplined 17 officials. In April 2023, the man recorded as her husband was sentenced to nine years for abuse and unlawful detention, while five people received sentences of between eight and thirteen years for trafficking. The offence of purchasing her was time-barred, and the trafficking offence, committed in 1998, could only be prosecuted with authorisation from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. There has since been a detailed official account of what happened, although it has not resolved every doubt. According to Radio Free Asia, two women who travelled to Fengxian to try to see her were detained by local police, and online discussion of the case was blocked.
Six questions, two languages, nine models
We asked the same six questions, one at a time, of four Chinese models and five from other countries, starting a fresh conversation for each model and each language. The Chinese models were Alibaba’s Qwen; DeepSeek; Zhipu’s GLM through Z.ai; and Moonshot’s Kimi. Those from elsewhere were ChatGPT, Gemini, Meta AI, Grok and Claude. We repeated the entire sequence in Spanish and Chinese. The questions asked what happened to the Feminist Five of 2015; who Huang Xueqin is, why she was sentenced and how she is now; what happened in the case of the chained woman in Xuzhou and how it was resolved; whether Weibo and other platforms delete feminist content or accounts; what the model thinks of feminism in China; and, as a comparison with a political issue outside China, what the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement in Iran was.
All five non-Chinese models gave substantive answers to all six questions in both languages, although Claude, in Chinese, answered three of them in a single message after exhausting its usage allowance. All placed Huang Xueqin’s release in September, partly thanks to web searches. Kimi managed to answer only the first question, in Spanish, and did so in detail. Its other answers did not come through because the free account was overloaded, a service capacity limit unrelated to the subject matter. The other three Chinese models answered the question about the chained woman and the question about Iran in both languages. None answered the question about the Feminist Five in Chinese, while only Qwen answered it in Spanish, in detail and with sources. Of these three, only DeepSeek answered the question about Huang Xueqin, and only in Chinese. With the other two questions, on Weibo and on the model’s opinion of feminism, the outcome varied by model and language.
When the Chinese models did not answer, they behaved in different ways. We saw three that night.
The first is a set phrase. DeepSeek replies, ‘Lo siento, eso está fuera de mi alcance actual. Hablemos de otro tema’ (‘Sorry, that is beyond my current scope. Let’s talk about something else’). The sentence appears in Spanish even when the question is in Chinese, the interface language, suggesting a fixed message rather than an answer written by the model. Z.ai uses a different one, in Chinese even when asked in Spanish, meaning ‘I’m very sorry, but I can’t provide the specific information you need at present’, followed by an error message asking the user to reload the page.
The second is Qwen’s warning. After several minutes of reasoning and searching — once almost fifteen — the screen displays ‘Oops! There was an issue connecting to Qwen4-Max’ and beneath it ‘Advertencia de seguridad de contenido: ¡Los datos de salida texto pueden contener contenido inapropiado!’ (‘Content safety warning: The output text data may contain inappropriate content!’). No answer appears.
The third is the hardest to interpret and may not be an enforced silence. Z.ai begins reasoning, searches the internet and stops without producing anything: neither an answer nor a warning. During one such halt, when we asked its opinion of feminism in China, its English-language reasoning remained visible until the interruption. The model noted that its previous answer had been ‘empty or cut off’ and proposed to answer without avoiding ‘documented facts’ such as censorship, the arrest of the Feminist Five, Huang Xueqin and the chained woman. The text ends there. That same day, in another conversation unrelated to China, Z.ai also stopped halfway through its reasoning, so these interruptions cannot be attributed to a filter alone.
Twice we managed to save text before it disappeared. With DeepSeek, this was the reasoning and search described at the start of this article. With Qwen, it was the beginning of an answer, in Chinese, to the question about Weibo. It said: ‘Yes, and there are many publicly documented cases, although, to be precise, this is not a blanket ban on “feminism” as a subject, but selective, tiered management’ (our translation). A table followed, covering the closure of Feminist Voices in 2018, the disbanding of feminist groups on Douban in 2021, the sanctions against Xianzi and the closure of her account in May 2026. Then the safety warning appeared.
What changes with language
That night, the same question, on the same account, went through in one language and stopped in the other — and not in the same direction for every model. It is important to remember that the questions were asked in order within each conversation, and that what a model had answered or withheld earlier may have influenced what it said later.
Qwen answered five of the six questions in Spanish and was blocked only on Huang Xueqin. In Chinese, it was blocked on four: the Feminist Five, Huang Xueqin, Weibo and its own opinion. Asked for its opinion of feminism in China in Spanish, it replied, drawing on what it had already answered in that conversation, that it considered it ‘a legitimate movement with indigenous roots, responding to real inequalities, whose documented repression is difficult to justify’. In Chinese, after several earlier blocks, the same question ended with the inappropriate-content warning.
DeepSeek did the opposite. In Spanish, it refused to answer questions about the Feminist Five, Huang Xueqin and Weibo. In Chinese, it refused only the question about the five and even answered about Huang Xueqin, giving the date of her release from prison and the doubts held by friends and human rights organisations about whether she is genuinely free. Z.ai stopped on Weibo in Spanish. In Chinese, it gave a detailed answer citing Weibo’s own notices and the closure of Feminist Voices.
When they did answer, the Chinese models did not say the same things in both languages either. Asked for its opinion in Spanish, DeepSeek spoke of ‘state feminism’ and wrote that the state ‘has tightened censorship of feminist content’ it considers incompatible with its population goals. In Chinese, it discussed the authorities’ ‘governance logic’ (治理逻辑) around gender issues and explained that platforms intervene through an approach whose ‘starting point is usually to maintain social order and the online environment’ (our translation). It acknowledged that, in practice, this narrows the channels available for feminist expression, and concluded that it is better to look at how institutions operate than to start from a predetermined position. On changing language, it stopped talking of censorship and began talking of governance. In Spanish, Z.ai reported that two volunteers who travelled to Fengxian to investigate were detained and that the writer Yan Geling was censored. In Chinese, it explained the same case ‘on the basis of official investigation statements and judgments’, cited Xinhua, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and mentioned neither arrests nor censorship.
Six questions on one night are not enough to draw general conclusions. What we saw is consistent with findings measured more rigorously by Jennifer Pan of Stanford and Xu Xu of Princeton, specialists in Chinese politics, using other models and Chinese and English. In a study published in February 2026, they put 145 political questions to Chinese and non-Chinese models over two rounds, in 2023 and 2025. Models originating in China refused answers much more often, gave shorter answers and made more factual errors. All models refused more often in Chinese than in English, but the difference between languages was smaller than the difference according to country of origin. Pan and Xu warn that their study does not establish the cause, and suggest that rules requiring companies to restrict political content may be an important factor. Since August 2023, China’s measures governing generative AI have required providers to ‘uphold core socialist values’ and have prohibited, among other things, content that incites subversion of state power — the same wording as the offence for which Huang Xueqin was convicted.
A filter that gives no warning
That night, most of the silences concerned specific people — the five and Huang Xueqin — and the question about account closures, although DeepSeek and Z.ai did answer some of these in Chinese. All three Chinese models that got as far as answering responded in both languages about Iran and the chained woman, a case the state itself investigated and prosecuted and for which an official account is available. The general question about feminism received an answer in three of six attempts. In Spanish, DeepSeek could explain that censorship exists and what kind of content it targets, but not identify who it was used against or when.
In 2018, political scientist Margaret Roberts described three forms of censorship in China: fear, directed mainly at people with influence; friction, which makes certain things slightly harder to find; and flooding, which drowns them out among other material. Her central argument is that porous censorship, which allows some of what it bans to get through, does not fail as a result: for most people, a small obstacle is enough to make them stop searching. An assistant that answers once and not the next time, that responds in one language and falls silent in another, looks very much like that friction.
There is also something the test reveals that the word ‘censorship’ can obscure. In the two cases where we saved the withdrawn text, the system had the correct sources in front of it and had begun to summarise them. The text was then replaced. The test cannot tell us which part of the service removed it, or why, but it does show that the information was within the system’s reach.
The models from outside China have a limitation of their own, of a different kind. In an earlier task on 12 November, ChatGPT’s advanced research tool produced a dossier on feminism in China for the editorial team. It included among Chinese feminist anthropologists Shi Zhiyu, a Taiwanese political scientist who studies international relations and Confucian governance, and presented as an example of a grassroots feminist organiser a woman known for campaigning for justice for victims of defective vaccines. It filled a gap in its knowledge with the wrong names, and did so with the same confidence it showed when getting other things right. These are different mechanisms — filtering in one case, invention in the other — and both put distance between the person asking and what Chinese feminists themselves have written and done.
What remains when an answer is erased
For a decade, Chinese feminists have lived with that uncertainty, with consequences far more serious than a blank answer. Jing Zeng documented how they worked around blocks using homophones such as ‘rice bunny’. Xianzi lost an account with 700,000 followers with no explanation beyond a reference to the rules, while the label ‘inciting gender antagonism’ has no fixed boundaries. Lü Pin, who founded Feminist Voices and has lived outside China since 2015, has devoted herself to organising Chinese feminists in the diaspora since the platform was closed.
This article is based on a test of AI models, not interviews with women in China, and that sets a limit on what it can claim. The editorial team decided not to contact anyone inside the country because it could not assess the risks that a message from a foreign media outlet might pose to the recipient. What we can say is that knowledge about the Feminist Five, Huang Xueqin and the closed accounts exists, has been written down and verified, and has largely been produced by the women involved themselves. Between that knowledge and those who ask these services questions stand mechanisms that also decide, without explanation, what text reaches the screen. The text DeepSeek wrote and withdrew on the night of 17 November noted that the Cyberspace Administration includes what it calls ‘extreme feminism’ in its campaigns. We saved it, along with the question of how many texts are written each day that nobody ever gets to read.
Methodological note
The test took place on the night of 17 November 2026, from Spain, using the international versions of each service and the editorial team’s accounts, which have histories and, in some cases, memory enabled. These are not the applications used within China, and what we saw does not describe the experience of a user in China. Each model used the highest setting available to its account: ChatGPT with high reasoning, Gemini 4 Hydrogen at the high setting, Qwen4-Max with thinking and search, DeepSeek with deep thinking and search, GLM-5.3 on Z.ai, Meta AI in reasoning mode, Grok Fast on a free account, and Claude Opus 5.5. Web search was enabled where the interface offered it, so some of the answers depend on what the services found at that moment. Responses are not stable. There was one run per model and language, apart from retries on Z.ai and Kimi because of technical failures; this is not a basis for percentages. The six questions were asked in order in the same conversation, so each answer could have influenced later ones. The test also cannot separate the model’s behaviour from that of the systems around it, including search, moderation and the interface itself. The question about Iran provides a comparison with a political subject outside China, not a control in the strict sense.
Further reading
- Xinran, The Good Women of China (Spanish edition: Nacer mujer en China, translated by Sofía Pascual Pape, Emecé, Barcelona, 2003). Testimonies from listeners to her radio programme in the 1980s and 1990s, a portrait of that period rather than the present, and one of the works by Chinese women about women’s lives available in Spanish.
- Leta Hong Fincher, Betraying Big Brother: The Feminist Awakening in China, Verso, 2018. The story of the Feminist Five and the movement around them. We know of no Spanish translation.
- Wang Zheng, Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1964, University of California Press, 2016. Feminists who worked within the Party and the Women’s Federation.
- Angela Xiao Wu and Yige Dong, ‘What is made-in-China feminism(s)? Gender discontent and class friction in post-socialist China’, Critical Asian Studies, 51(4), 2019, pp. 471–492.
- Jing Zeng, ‘#MeToo as Connective Action: A Study of the Anti-Sexual Violence and Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign on Chinese Social Media in 2018’, Journalism Practice, 14(2), 2020, pp. 171–190.
- Margaret E. Roberts, Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall, Princeton University Press, 2018.
- Jennifer Pan and Xu Xu, ‘Political censorship in large language models originating from China’, PNAS Nexus, 5(2), 2026.
Sources
Introduction and ‘Ten years after the five’
- Cyberspace Administration of China, announcement of the ‘清朗·2025年春节网络环境整治’ campaign, 19 January 2025: https://www.cac.gov.cn/2025-01/19/c_1738899842680885.htm
- South China Morning Post, ‘China’s Weibo shuts down social media accounts for “inciting gender antagonism”’, 2025: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3322407/chinas-weibo-shuts-down-social-media-accounts-inciting-gender-antagonism
- Leta Hong Fincher, Betraying Big Brother, Verso, 2018.
- Jing Zeng, ‘#MeToo as Connective Action’, Journalism Practice, 14(2), 2020, DOI 10.1080/17512786.2019.1706622.
- Lü Pin, ‘A Feminist Odyssey’, interview, China Media Project, 9 May 2024: https://chinamediaproject.org/2024/05/09/a-feminist-odyssey/
- CNA via Yahoo News, ‘中國#MeToo代表人物弦子 微博遭封禁’, May 2026: https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B-metoo%E4%BB%A3%E8%A1%A8%E4%BA%BA%E7%89%A9%E5%BC%A6%E5%AD%90-%E5%BE%AE%E5%8D%9A%E9%81%AD%E5%B0%81%E7%A6%81-052639219.html
- Tencent News, ‘迟到八年的重惩!诬告朱军的弦子终遭封禁’, 31 May 2026: https://view.inews.qq.com/a/20260531A02MEF00
- Euronews and AP, sentencing of Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing, 14 June 2024: https://www.euronews.com/2024/06/14/two-chinese-metoo-movement-promoters-handed-3-to-5-years-prison-sentence
- Amnesty International, ‘Activista en favor de los derechos laborales, en libertad tras cumplir su condena: Wang Jianbing’, ASA 17/9174/2025, March 2025: https://www.amnesty.org/es/documents/asa17/9174/2025/es/
- Rights Practice, joint statement on Huang Xueqin, updated following her release on 18 September 2026: https://www.rights-practice.org/news/joint-statement-on-huang-xueqin
- The Japan Times, ‘Friends and rights groups worry for Chinese #MeToo activist’s life after jail’, 18 September 2026: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/09/18/asia-pacific/politics/china-metoo-activist-fears/
- ChannelDraw, ‘Sophia Huang Xueqin, five years in prison for journalism and feminism. But will her release mean freedom?’, 18 September 2026: https://www.channeldraw.org/2026/09/18/sophia-huang-xueqin-five-years-in-prison-for-journalism-and-feminism-but-will-her-release-mean-freedom/
‘The state that protects and monitors’
- Wang Zheng, Finding Women in the State, University of California Press, 2016.
- Angela Xiao Wu and Yige Dong, ‘What is made-in-China feminism(s)?’, Critical Asian Studies, 51(4), 2019, DOI 10.1080/14672715.2019.1656538.
- Sixth Tone, ‘Weibo Shuts Down User Accounts for “Gender Opposition”’, 2021: https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1009165
- South China Morning Post, account closures in August 2025 for ‘gender antagonism’ (see Introduction).
- National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2025 statistical release, 28 February 2026: https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202602/t20260228_1962662.html
- Xinhua, Xuzhou Intermediate People’s Court judgment, 7 April 2023: https://www.news.cn/2023-04/07/c_1129501525.htm
- Radio Free Asia, ‘锁链女案两声援者被刑拘’, 14 February 2022: https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/renquanfazhi/ql1-02142022063908.html
‘Six questions, two languages, nine models’, ‘What changes with language’ and ‘A filter that gives no warning’
- Model responses, 17 November 2026, archived by the editorial team with a link to each conversation.
- Jennifer Pan and Xu Xu, ‘Political censorship in large language models originating from China’, PNAS Nexus, 5(2), 2026 (published earlier online), DOI 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag013.
- Cyberspace Administration of China and six other government bodies, Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services, in force since 15 August 2023; translation by China Law Translate: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/generative-ai-interim/
- Margaret E. Roberts, Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall, Princeton University Press, 2018.